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PROBATE LAW
I. DECISION THAT ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN MAY INHERIT FROM
FATHERS' ESTATES TO BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY IN LIMITED
SITUATIONS
In 1977 the United States Supreme Court held in Trimble v.
Gordon1 that statutes prohibiting illegitimate children from inheriting
from their intestate fathers violate equal protection. More than eleven
years later, the South Carolina Supreme Court held in Mitchell v.
Hardwick2 that the Trimble decision will be applied retroactively in
limited situations. The court's holding in Mitchell is a modification of
its previous position in Wilson v. Jones.3 In Wilson the court held that
pursuant to Trimble, South Carolina Code section 21-3-30,4 allowing
illegitimate children to inherit only from their mothers' estates, vio-
lated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution. 5 The Wilson court, however, limited its
holding to prospective application from the date of the Trimble deci-
sion.6 Thus, only illegitimate children whose fathers died after April
26, 1977 could inherit from their fathers' estates. The Mitchell decision
now permits illegitimate children whose fathers died prior to April 26,
1977 to inherit from their fathers in limited circumstances.'
The case arose when Hue Eady died intestate in 1975, leaving two
adopted daughters as his heirs at law. At the time of his death, he
owned 130 acres of land. In 1984, Joseph Mitchell, claiming to be the
illegitimate son of Eady, petitioned the lower court for partition of the
property.8 Relying on Wilson, the lower court denied the petition, rul-
ing that Mitchell could not inherit, since his father died prior to the
1977 Trimble decision.9
In considering whether to modify the Wilson ruling, the South
Carolina Supreme Court found persuasive two recent decisions from
1. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
2. 297 S.C. 48, 374 S.E.2d 681 (1988).
3. 281 S.C. 230, 314 S.E.2d 341 (1984).
4. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-30 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (amended 1985) (repealed 1987).
5. Wilson, 281 S.C. at 232, 314 S.E.2d at 343.
6. Id. at 233, 314 S.E.2d at 343.
7. Mitchell, 297 S.C. at 51, 374 S.E.2d at 683.
8. Id. at 49, 374 S.E.2d at 682.
9. Id. at 50, 374 S.E.2d at 682.
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Tennessee ° and West Virginia.' Apparently following the path of
these decisions, the court decided that the prospective only application
of Trimble was unnecessarily harsh in some situations. Thus, the court
held that Trimble would be applied retroactively when the following
conditions are met:
(1) innocent persons will not be adversely affected because of their
detrimental reliance on the old rule; (2) the paternity of the child has
been conclusively established either by court order or decree issued
prior to the death of the father or by an instrument signed by the
father acknowledging paternity; and (3) the estate administration is
subject to further resolution.1'
In Mitchell undisputed evidence established that the petitioner-
appellant was the son of Eady. Most significantly, Eady had executed a
deed in 1974 conveying some property to Mitchell, stating the property
was given "'for and in consideration of the sum of Five ($5.00) Dollars,
love and affection to me paid by my son, Joseph Mitchell.' "13 The
signed instrument was sufficient to satisfy the court's second condition.
Since the other two conditions also were met, Mitchell was held enti-
tled to inherit from his intestate father.'
4
The court noted that the primary arguments against retroactivity
are "the disruption of the orderly probate process, the difficulty of
proving paternity, and the denial of rights of those who have detrimen-
tally relied on the old law." 5 By limiting the retroactive application of
Trimble to situations in which these concerns will not create problems,
the court has balanced the need to maintain stability in the probate
process with the need to protect the rights of individuals. This ap-
proach is consistent with trends in other states and is simply good
law.'
0
10. Marshall v. Marshall, 670 S.W.2d 213 (Tenn. 1984) (allowing limited retroactiv-
ity of Trimble when the relationship was proven by clear and convincing evidence and no
hardship would result upon those who had justifiably relied on the old rules).
11. Williamson v. Gane, 345 S.E.2d 318 (W. Va. 1986) (modifying its former pro-
spective only application of Trimble to allow retroactive application when there has been
no justified detrimental reliance on the old rule or when the estate administration is
subject to further resolution).
12. Mitchell, 297 S.C. at 51, 374 S.E.2d at 683.
13. Id. at 49, 374 S.E.2d at 682 (quoting deed from Eady to Mitchell dated May 3,
1974).
14. Id. at 51, 374 S.E.2d at 683.
15. Id., 374 S.E.2d at 682-83.
16. See, e.g., Marshall v. Marshall, 670 S.W.2d 213 (Tenn. 1984); Williamson v.
Gane, 345 S.E.2d 318 (W. Va. 1986); see also Traynor, Quo Vadis Prospective Overrul-
ing: A Question of Judicial Responsibility, 28 HASTINGs L.J. 533 (1977) (stating that the
rule of "prospective only" application should be employed only when the hardship on
those who relied on the old rule outweighs the hardship on persons denied the benefits of
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Unlike Mitchell, the Wilson decision did not specify what evi-
dence would establish paternity. The result is that illegitimate children
whose fathers died prior to April 27, 1977 must meet the Mitchell test,
while those whose fathers died after this date arguably do not. On June
20, 1985, the General Assembly amended South Carolina Code section
21-3-301 to permit an illegitimate child to inherit through the father if
the father had signed an instrument acknowledging paternity or if pa-
ternity was established by court order or decree during the father's
lifetime.18 Presumably, the 1985 amendment was meant to be prospec-
tive only and did not apply when the father died prior to that date.
The result is a gap in the law regarding what evidence is sufficient to
establish paternity during the years subsequent to Trimble and prior
to the 1985 amendment of section 21-3-30.
The South Carolina Probate Code,19 effective July 1, 1987, re-
pealed the amended section 21-3-30. Section 62-2-109(2)20 now pro-
vides that illegitimate children may inherit from their fathers if pater-
nity is adjudicated during the father's lifetime or within six months
after his death.21 The new section, however, does not expressly permit
written acknowledgement by the father.
The Mitchell decision affects only illegitimate children whose fa-
thers died prior to April 27, 1977. To determine what law governs the
rights of other illegitimate children, the practitioner should look to the
status of the law at the time of the father's death, since the proof re-
quired to establish paternity will vary depending on the date of death.
The present status of the law seems to be that illegitimate chil-
dren whose fathers died prior to April 27, 1977 may inherit if the con-
ditions of Mitchell are satisfied. Those whose fathers died after April
27, 1977, but prior to June 20, 1985, may inherit, but it is unclear what
evidence is required to establish paternity.22 Illegitimate children of fa-
thers who died after June 20, 1985, but prior to July 1, 1987, may in-
herit if the requirements of former section 21-3-3023 are met. And fi-
nally, illegitimate children whose fathers died after July 1, 1987 may
inherit if paternity is established by court decree, either prior to or
the new rule).
17. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-30 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (amended 1985) (repealed 1987).
18. Id.
19. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-1-100 to -7-603 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1988).
20. Id. § 62-2-109.
21. Id. Illegitimacy may also be overcome if "the natural parents participated in a
marriage ceremony before or after the birth of the child, even though the attempted
marriage is void." Id.
22. See Wilson v. Jones, 281 S.C. 230, 314 S.E.2d 341 (1984).
23. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-30 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (amended 1985) (repealed 1987).
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within six months of the father's death.2
The confusing state of the law concerning inheritances of illegiti-
mate children may lead to uncertainty both on the part of attorneys
called upon to advise their clients and judges required to render deci-
sions. Nonetheless, careful attorneys will be able to decide whether in-
heritance is possible by focusing on the proper standard as determined
by the father's date of death. Although Mitchell may be viewed ini-
tially as a frustrating decision, in that it creates another standard by
which to determine whether an illegitimate child may inherit, it is ac-
tually a decision that was much needed and will lead to far more equi-
table results than were previously possible.
Janet Laws Carter
24. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 62-2-109 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1988).
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